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Abstract—The growing sophistication of cyber attacks, vulner-
abilities in high computing systems and increasing dependency on
cryptography to protect our digital data make it more important
to keep secret keys safe and secure. Few major issues on secret
keys like incorrect use of keys, inappropriate storage of keys,
inadequate protection of keys, insecure movement of keys, lack
of audit logging, insider threats and non-destruction of keys
can compromise the whole security system dangerously. In this
article, we have proposed and implemented an isolated secret key
memory which can log life cycle of secret keys cryptographically
using blockchain (BC) technology. We have also implemented a
special custom bus interconnect which receives custom crypto
instruction from Processing Element (PE). During the execution
of crypto instructions, the architecture assures that secret key
will never come in the processor area and the movement of
secret keys to various crypto core is recored cryptographically
after the proper authentication process controlled by proposed
hardware based BC. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work which uses blockchain based solution to address the
issues of the life cycle of the secret keys in hardware platform.
The additional cost of resource usage and timing complexity we
spent to implement the proposed idea is very nominal. We have
used Xilinx Vivado EDA tool and Artix 7 FPGA board.
Index Terms—Blockchain, FPGA, Key Memory, Secret Key
Life Cycle
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of a crypto system depends on three primary
keys. Symmetric Key: is used to encrypt bulk data in symmet-
ric key algorithms like AES, TDES, DES etc. Private Keys: of
public-private key pair used in Asymmetric Key Cryptography
such as RSA, Diffie Helmen etc. Private key is used for
signature generation and key exchange process. Hash Key:
is used to check integrity and authenticity of transactions and
data with algorithms like SHA-3. Increasing volume of secret
key and data protected by those keys makes the cryptographic
key management relevant in current research trend [1]. There
are several threats causes compromised key. In this article we
have discussed about few major threats.
A. Storage
In many sense, processor based architectures are flexible
but it can be exposed to software threats like cache attack[2],
bus snooping [3], memory disclosure attack [4] etc. hence the
storage of secret keys should be separated form software area
and it should be isolated from any physical connection of
processor.
B. Insecure Movement
A security processor allows key movements between several
cores like Key Memory, RNG, Hash, Symmetric Key and
Asymmetric Key core. All these key movement to the key
memory and from the key memory should be authenticated
and secured. These transactions of key mainly suffers two
issues. A The buses used for these movements can be snooped
by software attacks. B The request of key can be issued
from some compromised IP placed inside the architecture.
To overcome attack-A the most effective solutions are bus
encryption [3], or partition of software area from these buses
[5]. Attack-B can be prevented by verifying the signature of
the requestee IP. To the best of our knowledge we did not find
any similar solution in hardware platform.
C. Non-destruction
Once the signature of requestee IP is verified, the key should
be released to the proper destination. Except the pre-master
key, other keys should be destroyed securely. This removal
of key should be logged cryptographically and should non-
traceable.
D. Audit Logging
The secret keys of a security processor is the most sensitive
data. The creation, deletion and the movement of secret key
should be logged and audited cryptographically otherwise
it will be difficult to identify a compromise for forensic
investigation.
E. Incorrect use of keys
The generated master keys are for specific purposes. Hash
core can not use encryption key and vice versa. If the keys are
used for something else, the proper protection action should be
taken. The main contribution of this article are stated below:
• This article proposes a security processor architecture
which is partitioned in three separated areas such as
processor area, crypto area, and confidential area. This
architecture assures that secret key memory is isolated
form processor area.
• The architecture proposes a blockchain based auditor
to monitor secret key lifecycles. The architecture pre-
vents insecure movement, unauthorized key request, non-
destruction issued and incorrect use of keys.
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• The proposed security processor can execute 21 custom
crypto instructions as shown in Table II.
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Fig. 1: Custom Bus Interconnect
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II. ARCHITECTURE
In this architecture we have partitioned three areas such
as (i) processor area, (II) crypto area and (iii)confidential
area. The whole architectural details is stated in [6]. The
partitioned and isolated confidential area to store secret keys
assures that the secret key never come in the processor
area because the processor area is very much vulnerable
for various software threats. The main contribution of the
proposed article is to add a special private blockchain to
audit the movement of secret keys. Each secret key movement
is authenticated and registered cryptographically. To adopt
blockchain, we have designed the data path controller
(DPC), custom bus interconnect (CBI), buffer and a
Signature Checker (SC) core. The architecture can exe-
cute 21 crypto instructions divided in 5 categories as shown
in Table II. All these proposed instructions are executed
by DPC and CBI . As instructed by the TLS white pa-
per [7], the architecture processes instructions for pre −
master key generation, master key generation, hash and
encryption process. For the proposed blockchain process we
have created a new category named as common purpose. The
details of other instructions are not described because of page
restriction. It is to be noted that blockchain data is written in
main memory which can be accessed by the PE.
A. Custom Bus Interconnect
The proposed custom bus interconnect (CBI) is a junction
through which various crypto cores and the buffer which is
created as gateway of Master Key Memory (MKM) can
communicate. Various paths of crypto cores and buffer are
controlled by 4 bits input and 4 bit output addresses. Input-
output address pins are controlled by data path controller
(DPC) IP. In our current version of design, we have 4 inputs
coming from buffer, output of hash, output of RNG and
output of RSA. The 5 outputs of CBI are connected with
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Fig. 3: System Architecture
buffer, key of AES, key of hash and key of RSA block.
The synchronization signals of input cores and output cores
are also taken care of by CBI . The fig. 1 shows the synchro-
nization signals such as RNG_done, Buff_rd, Hash_done,
Buff_rdy, Hash_key_rdy and En_key_rdy. The CBI is
combination of MUX and DE-MUX where MUX’s output is
connected with DEMUX’s input. The input address and output
address pins are the selecting inputs of MUX and DE-MUX
respectively.
B. Data Path Controller
The proposed data path controller (DPC) is a slave IP
of PE. The PE can send 21 instructions by Application
Peripheral Interface (API) call for various crypto operations
of TLS protocol. The data path controller maintains a
control word register to execute the 21 instructions as shown
in Table II. The PE can communicate DPC by AXI bus
through PE bus interconnect. In the current version of
hardware, DPC has 16 bits control word to control various
crypto cores placed in the crypto area. The data path and
binaries for all proposed instructions are shown in II. As
shown in fig. 2, the 11th bit is set to logic 1 to enable the
custom bus interconnect, otherwise it will be logic 0 to
disable the said interconnect. The 16th to 13th bits are used
to select the input address. If the input address is 0000,
RNG will be selected. It will be 0001, 0010 and 0011 to select
Buff , Hash and PubEn core respectively. The 12th and 9th
bit is to address outputs. The output address will be 0000,
0001, 0010, 0011 and 0100 to select the Buff , Hash_Key,
En_key, Hash_In and Pub_en_in core. The 6th to 1st bit
of control word register (CWR) are used to enable different
hardware blocks such as RSA, RNG, Hash, Enc, MKM
and Buff . The PE directly can write to CWR to control the
data path of the hardwares placed in the crypto area.
C. Buffer
The proposed buffer is a gateway to write or read keys to the
MKM . This buffer can accommodate data, timestamp from
timer IP, pre − hash from Signature Checker, read/write
operation, signature of data and the system status. The
TABLE I: Comparison Results
#
key
storage
Incorrect
use
Insecure
movement Destruction
Audit
log
Propo
sed
key
memory × × × X
[5]
2011
key
memory X X X ×
[8]
2010
key
memory X X X ×
[6]
2018
key
memory X X X ×
[9]
2019
main
memory X X × X
[3]
2009
main
memory X × X ×
[2]
2015
cache
memory × X X ×
[10]
2007
main
memory X X X ×
X=possible, ×=not possible
system status comes from the enable ports and ready ports
of all the existing IPs including crypto cores. Instruction-1
writes 384 bit random number from RNG to the data portion
of Buffer. Similarly instruction 9, 17 and 18 can write 512
bit data from KECCAK and 1024 bits from RSA respectively.
D. Signature Checker
The Signature Checker (SC) consists two main parts such
as KECCAK hash and RSA block to verify signature of the
IPs requested to read or write to MKM . This IP receives the
signature from buffer. The signature is the encrypted hash
of data. The SC first decrypt it by the RSA block with the
public key of requestee IP. The requestee IP is addressed by
the source IP address available in CWR. After that SC gets
the hash of data. The data is already available in the buffer.
If the hash of buffer data is matched with the decrypted data
by RSA then the requested transaction will be granted by SC.
III. IMPLEMENTATION & RESULTS
The proposed architecture is implemented in Artix-7
(csg324-100t)FPGA using Vivado Tool. The additional hard-
wares added to the original architecture to protect the keys
form major threats as stated in Table I are SC, buffer and
the CBI . The signature checker consist of a KECCAK and
RSA-1024 which cost 4188 and 31008 slices respectively.
The base architecture without blockchain consumes 50k logic
cells. The architecture with blockchain to protect severe key
threats consumes 95k logic cells which is around 45% of
the total logic cells available in Artix-7 FPGA. As shown
in Table I articles [5], [8] and [6] proposed dedicated secret
key memories which are completely isolated from processor
area to prevent software threats but this architecture does not
prevent incorrect use, insecure movement and non-destructions
issues of keys. If any spoofing IPs or dishonest probes already
exist inside the architectures of [5], [8] and [6] and try to read
secret key stored in dedictaed key memory, the system will
allow the key transaction to those malicious nodes. Though
the dedicated key memories proposed in these article are
physically isolated but can not prevent said incorrect and
insecure movement of secret keys. Articles [5], [8] and [6]
do not have any facility to investigate the key movement and
TABLE II: Instructions Implemented in Proposed Architecture
# Instruction Flow Function
CWR
(hex)
Bus
Inter
Connect
1
PE Send
Re-Seed PE to RNG
Send new seed to RNG from PE.R-
-NG needs seed to generate rand. no. 0010 AXI
R
N
G 2 Gen RND RNG to Buff
Enable RNG to Generate Random
Number, and write RND in data
portion of Buffer 0050 Custom
M
as
te
r
by
3
RNG Write
Block Gen to Buff
Block Generation for Write Operation
on MKM from RNG. Buff reads, time
stamp from timer IP, prehash from
Signature Checker, write operation
the system status, source & dest. IP ID 0091 Custom
Pr
e
4
Re-Key
RSA PE to RSA PE writes pub key of server to RSA 0020 AXI
5
PE Get
En-RNG RSA to PE Encrypt RND using server pub key XXXX AXI
6
PE Send Rands
in Hash
PE to Hash
by DMA
PE sends server random number
and client random number to Hash XXXX AXI
M
as
te
r
K
ey
7
Hash Read
Block Gen to Buff
Block Generation for Read Operation
from MKM by Hash. Buff reads , time
stamp from timer IP, prehash from
Signature Checker, read operation,
the system status, source & dest. IP ID 11C1 Custom
8
Get M-Key
Hash Buff to Hash read master key to generate four keys 1149 Custom
9 Gen Keys Hash to Buff Write keys to Buff 2049 Custom
10
Hash Write
Block Gen Hash to Buff
Block Generation for write Operation
to MKM 20C9 Custom
E
nc
ry
pt
io
n
11
En Read
Block Gen to Buff
Block Generation for Read Operation
from MKM by En. Buff reads , time
stamp from timer IP, prehash from
Signature Checker, read operation,
the system status, source & dest. IP ID 12C1 Custom
12
Get EN Key
from Buff Buff to En Read En. key from buffer 1245 DMA
13 GEN EN Shared to Shared
AES block reads plaintext form SM
& write cypher to SM using DMA XXXX Custom
14
Hash Read
Block Gen to Buff Same as Instruction 7 11C1 Custom
15
Get Key
Hash Buff to Hash Same as Instruction 8 1149 Custom
H
as
h
16 GEN Hash Shared to Shared
KECCAK block reads plaintext form SM
& write digest to SM using DMA XXX DMA
17
Hash of
Buff load Buff to Hash
1st step of signature: load
Buff data to Hash input 1341 Custom
18
Hash
to Buff Hash Op to Buff
2nd step of signature: load hash
output to buffer 2049 Custom
e 19
PubEn
of Buff Buff to PubEn
3rd step of signature: load buffer
in PubEn input 1461 Custom
Si
gn
at
ur
20
PubEn
to Buff
Output of public
key encrypted
data to buffer
4th step of signature: load encrypted da-
ta of PubEn to buffer which is the signa-
ture of buffer data in 1st step 3061 Custom
21 Verify Sig Buff to MKM
if signature matched
buffer data sent to MKM 1XX3 Custom
to prevent non-destruction issue. Amazon Web Server [9] is
one of the most recent software based key management archi-
tecture which can audit and investigate tracking of secret keys,
but it cannot prevent the insecure movement and incorrect
use of key. It does not have any signature checking facility
on the key request. In our architecture we have introduced
dedicated secret key memory which is physically isolated
from processor area. Any read write operation on this secret
key memory named as Master Key Memory (MKM) is
blockchain based. We have observed the usual operations on
MKM are related with RNG, HASH , and AES block. The
Public and Private keys of all these crypto IPs are already
generated in offline by an automatic script during the RTL
development. The pre master key is generated by RNG
which needs to be written in MKM through buffer as shown
in Table II instructions 2, 3, and 17 to 21. Instruction 2 writes
random number generated by RNG into buffer. The buffer
also stores the public keys of RNG (Source IP) and MKM
(Destination). The buffer includes timestamp form TIMER
IP, and stores all the current status of Done and Enable pin of
available IPs in the proposed design. The instructions 17 to 21
generate signature of the write operation on MKM by RNG.
TABLE III: Summery of Trade-off
Partition Path SC Base
Memory Controller RSA KECCAK Design
Slice 0 76 31008 4188 50223
BRAM 7.5 0 0 0 32
Clock 2 2 3048 24 NA
latency 20 ns 10 ns 86us 67.2 ns NA
Feature
/ role
prevent
SW attacks
control crypto
instrcutions
prevent insecure movment &
incorrect use of keys; audit log
implements basic hw
for secuirty processor
NA=Base desgn consists of diferent hardwares having different latency & clock
This signature will also be stored in buffer. This signature
will be verified by the Signature Checker IP placed inside
Confidential Area as stated in fig.3. If the signature is
matched then the pre master key generated by RNG will be
written in MKM , otherwise the transaction will be discarded
form the buffer. The other read write requests on MKM are
(ii)read pre master key by HASHt to generate master key
(Instruction 7 and 8)(ii)write masterkeys in MKM (Instruc-
tion 9 and 10). (iii)read master key form MKM by hash
(Instruction 14 and 15)and (iv) read master key form MKM
by AES (Instruction 11 and 13). All these read write opera-
tions follows Instruction 17 and 21 for authentic checking of
the requestee. The verification process of signature checker
IP using the buffer data with system status, timestamp,
signature and the pre hash prevents incorrect use and insecure
movement of keys. The MKM also delete the keys which are
already read to address non-destruction issue. The partitioned
memory for secret keys prevents software attacks. The timing
diagram of instruction 17, 18 and 19, 20 is shown in fig. 4
and fig. 5 respectively. Table III shows the trade off of latency
and resource usage with security features.
Fig. 4: Timing Overhead of Instruction 17 & 18
Fig. 5: Timing Overhead of Instruction 19 & 20
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article proposes a hardware blockchain with a parti-
tioned and dedicated secret key memory which prevents most
of the software attacks, insecure key movement, incorrect use,
non-destruction use secret key. Apart from this, if breach
of keys occurs in the system, the hardware blockchain can
investigate previous key transactions. To the best of our
knowledge, the FPGA based blockchain to prevent threats
stated in Table I is never explored. The additional hardware
adopted for blockchain is very nominal in-terms of resource
usage and throughput.
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